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I.　Preface
　Hashimoto & Takeda (1985) and Kikkawa (1991) pointed out that Japa-
nese cartels had three functions as follows :
　1)　restraining competition
　2)　balancing the conflicting interests of members
　3)　complementing resource
　The function 2) has not been put much weight in as the result that some 
studies on the prewar cartels have focused on the function 1) and others 
have focused on 3) exclusively.
　This paper will attach much weight to the function of balancing the con-
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flicting interests of members of cartels and make it appear that the function 
2) had abundant importance in prewar Japan through the case study of “To-
ren” 1） in the modern sugar manufacturing industry which means centrifugal 
sugar industry in colonial Taiwan.
　After “Toren” started as “Taiwan Togyo Rengokai” by five centrifugal sug-
ar companies such as the Taiwan, Meiji, Ensuiko, Toyo, and Niitaka Compa-
ny 2） in 1910 in order to reinforce the bargaining power on sailing raw sugar 
to white sugar companies, every centrifugal sugar company became a mem-
ber of the cartels in the second half of 1910s. “Toren” was carried on to the 
end of prewar Japan and had a great deal of relations with development of 
the modern sugar manufacturing industry, because “Toren” made it possible 
that members competed with each other on one hand and seek out coopera-
tion on the other.
　History of “Toren” can be divided into two periods as shown in Table 1. 
During the first half of 1910-28, the above mentioned function 1) was limited 
as a result of repeated conflict and failure on striking hands on the bargain-
ing of “Santo Shobun”  3） that depended on the bargaining of “Genryoto 
Baibai” 4）. In complete contrast, the bargaining was very successful with no 
exceptions during the second half of 1929-41 thanks to self-sufficiency of 
sugar within empire Japan. On the other hand, the bargaining of “Taiwan 
Santo Yuso” 5） was succeeded at all time without any exceptions as shown in 
Table 1.
　This paper will pay much attention to the first half, because during the pe-
riod function 2) as well as 3) was gone on in spite that function 1) was come 
1）　From now on, I will abbreviate “Togyo Rengokai” to“Toren”.
2）　From now on,“sugar manufacturing company” will be abbreviated to “Com-
pany”.
3）　“Santo Shobun” means deciding each company’s distribution ratio between 
raw sugar for white sugar and direct consumption one.
4）　“Genryoto Baibai” means deciding each raw sugar manufacturing company’s 
distribution ratio selling to white sugar manufacturing company.
5）　“Taiwan Santo Yuso” means bargaining with shipping companies on freight 
of shipping from Taiwan to Japan.
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Table 1　Situation of three main agreements aproved by “Toren”
“Santo Shobun 
Kyotei”
“Genryoto Baibai 
Keiyaku”
“Taiwan Santo 
Yuso Keiyaku”
1910 ○
1911 ○
1912 ○ ○ ○
1913 ○ ○ ○
1914 ○ ○ ○
1915 × × ○
1916 ○ ○ ○
1917 ○ ○ ○
1918 ○ ○ ○
1919 × × ○
1920 × × ○
1921 × × ○
1922 × × ○
1923 ○ ○ ○
1924 × × ○
1925 × × ○
1926 ○ ○ ○
1927 ○ ○ ○
1928 × ○ ○
1929 ○ ○ ○
1930 ○ ○ ○
1931 ○ ○ ○
1932 ○ ○ ○
1933 ○ ○ ○
1934 ○ ○ ○
1935 ○ ○ ○
1936 ○ ○ ○
1937 ○ ○ ○
1938 ○ ○ ○
1939 ○ ○ ○
1940 ○ ○
1941 ○ ○
Source :  Toren (1910-14), Toren (1923-39), Toren (1929-36), Toren (1931-36), Toren 
(1930-41), Toren (1919-42).
in scarcely. And I will clear out why “Toren” was not dissolved in spite of re-
peated conflict among members in the context of function of balancing the 
conflicting interests of them.
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II.　The conflict of interests and the reorganization in the modern
sugar manufacturing industry
(1)　The composition of layered conflict
　I will review what changed the three-tiered reorganization due to M&A to 
confirm the composition of the modern sugar manufacturing industry, focus-
ing on the perspective of the opposition structure as shown in Figure 1. The 
years under the company name in Figure 1 mark the times during which the 
company started running simultaneously from white sugar to raw sugar or 
from raw sugar to white sugar, and the Dainihon Company advanced to raw 
sugar industry immediately in December, 1906. The Dainihon company be-
came a key player in the raw sugar trade negotiation. However, the privi-
leged position of the Dainihon Company was notably challenged when the 
Kobe Refined Sugar Company merged with the Taiwan Company (February, 
Figure 1　Structural Outline of Conflict in the Modern Sugar manufacturing 
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    Note : Hatching of the company name : simultaneously manufacturing raw sugar and 
　    　   white sugar; underlining the company name : plantation white sugar ; arrowhead : 
　　       M&A relation ; R : raw sugar ; W : white sugar
Source : Taiwan Sotokufu (1913-40).
Industry and M&A
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1911) and the Yokohama Refined Sugar Company merged with the Meiji 
Company (June, 1911).
　The change to simultaneously manufacturing white sugar by raw sugar 
companies, including Tainan (January, 1915), Teikoku (June, 1916), Niitaka 
(July, 1916), and Ensuiko (August, 1920), but excluding the Toyo Company 
continued thereafter. The Toyo Company did not advance to white sugar 
production, but in 1917, it began producing plantation white sugar, 6） which 
increased in importance as a direct consumption sugar. Additionally, the En-
suiko Company began to produce plantation white sugar in 1909, and the 
Taiwan, Meiji, and Toyo Company also advanced to producing plantation 
white sugar.
　As evidenced by the facts noted above, the modern sugar manufacturing 
industry possessed a layered conflict structure whereby three levels of dif-
ferences were intertwined in a complex manner. More specifically, the in-
dustry shared a three-tiered conflict structure as
　follows :
　1)　Whether or not a sugar manufacturing company produced raw sugar 
and white sugar simultaneously
　2)　Whether or not it manufactured plantation white sugar as the “loaner” 
of white sugar
　3)　Whether or not it also manufactured non-centrifugal sugar such as 
brown sugar lumps
　Regarding Figure 1, companies were divided into two groups :  (1) the 
Dainihon Company, whose main industry was white sugar, and (2) the other 
companies that primarily produced raw sugar. This complex conflict struc-
ture within the sugar manufacturing industry was the result of three differ-
ent levels of manufacturing systems, as mentioned above, as well as the 
scale of the new type of sugar production facilities.
6）　Plantation white sugar was of a similar quality to white sugar and utilized the 
centrifugal sugar manufacturing method. Therefore, companies quickly ad-
vanced to producing white sugar, and in 1927, 10 out of 46 factories had planta-
tion white sugar facilities (Higuchi, 1959, pp. 5, 104).
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(2)　Reorganization of the three levels
　Based on this conflict structure, the three-tiered modern sugar manufac-
turing industry reorganization occurred as follows :
　1)　The first transformation occurred in the 1910s. Small-scale companies 
that used outdated facilities to manufacture only syrup-based sugar 
were the target of M&A by companies that possessed large-scale facili-
ties for the new type of sugar production.
　2)　The second reorganization period was marked by fluctuations in the 
financial crisis. In particular, the Tainan Company was sold to the 
Showa Company. Additionally, Dainihon merged with Toyo ̶ except 
for two factories that were sold to the Meiji Company ̶ and had effec-
tive control over the Niitaka Company.
　3)　The four-company system was established under the controlled econ-
omy in the war footing period, and above all, it was the M&A strategy of 
the Dainihon Company, which resulted in the merging of Showa and 
Teikoku that attracts specific attention. Thus, the existing system of 
four established companies was one in which Dainihon overcame its po-
sition as a later starter in the centrifugal sugar industry in Taiwan, 
caught up with the Taiwan Company, the pioneer of the same industry, 
and grew to become the first mover.
　Figures 2 to 4 demonstrate the three-tiered reorganization result. While 
similar to Figure 1, the simultaneous production of white sugar and planta-
tion white sugar was not accomplished in each step. Additionally, the differ-
ence in size of the circles marks the relative manufacturing capacity of each 
company.
　As demonstrated by Figure 2, which displays the composition after the 
first industry reorganization, the Taiwan Company excelled in a manufactur-
ing capacity, and was followed in size by Toyo, Ensuiko, Meiji, and Teikoku. 
This industry reorganization generally influences the differences of such a 
plant capacity, and one result of replacing seven factories by the Taiwan 
Company under the umbrella is expressed in Figure 2.
　The centrifugal sugar manufacturing capacity for the Dainihon Company 
did not fill 1/4 of the Taiwan Company, which demonstrated the advantage 
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of the first mover. Further, to have been above-mentioned, simultaneous 
running of raw and white sugar completed in the early step except for five 
companies such as the Toyo Company and the Ensuiko Company. However, 
it was a premature step for plantation white sugar. The Ensuiko Company, 
which was dealt with first in Taiwan, and the Toyo Company were engaged 
in producing plantation white sugar in 1918.
　Thus, as demonstrated in Figure 3, which shows the result of the second 
reorganization, the positions of Taiwan and Meiji did not change, but the sta-
tus of Dainihon, which replaced the Toyo Company under its umbrella 
(1927), improved remarkably. The result was that Ensuiko and Tainan ran si-
multaneous production of raw and white sugar in 1921, and the simultaneous 
production systems of all seven companies, except for Taito and Shinko, 
were ready.
　Likewise, Figure 3 outlines the movement concerning plantation white 
Figure 2　Production Systems after the First Reorganization (1918)
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sugar. In 1918, only four plantation white sugar factories (managed by two 
different companies) existed, and this increased to ten factories (managed 
by four different companies) by 1928. Out of three plantation white sugar 
factories owned by Toyo, two factories were sold to Meiji, and Dainihon ob-
tained one factory through the merger. As a result, in 1928 four primary sug-
ar manufacturing companies were able to simultaneously manufacture raw 
and white sugar and plantation and white sugar.
　It was during this second industry reorganization period that the system 
of the four primary sugar companies, Taiwan, Meiji, Dainihon, and Ensuiko, 
was steadily formed. This fact is confirmed in Table 2. The pulse duty factor 
of the four primary sugar manufacturing companies allowed their centrifugal 
sugar manufacturing capabilities to increase rapidly from 59.9％ in 1926 to 
74.2％ in 1928, and the pulse duty factor in centrifugal sugar production out-
put increased rapidly from 61.9％ in 1926‒27 to 76.2％ in 1927‒28.
Figure 3　Production Systems after the Second Reorganization (1928)
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　Thus, it is possible to confirm that the four big sugar company manufac-
turing system was steadily built during the second industry reorganization 
period.
　Finally, based on Figure 4, it is the growth of Dainihon that attracted the 
most attention. In 1935, Dainihon merged with Niitaka with whom they had 
grasped a management right since 1927 and developed big mergers with the 
Showa Company in 1939 and the Teikoku Company in 1941 with rapid suc-
cess. Dainihon had finally surpassed the Taiwan Company, which was the 
first mover in the modern sugar manufacturing industry. Additionally, Fig-
ure 4 demonstrates that a literal four-company system was established by 
the merging of Shinko with the Taiwan Company in 1941 and by the merg-
ing of Taito with Meiji in 1943.
Table 2　The Pulse Duty Factor in Centrifugal Sugar manufacturing Capability   
and Production Output　　　   　　　　　　　　　　　　
Company
manufacturing capability (ton) production output (thousand picul)
1927・3 (%) 1928・3 (%) 1926-
27
(%) 1927-
28
(%)
Taiwan   8,780   23.6 10,330   27.7 1,802 26.9 2,378   25.0 
Meiji   5,100   13.7   6,850   18.4    867 12.9 1,880   19.7 
Dainihon   3,200     8.6   6,400   17.2    613   9.1 1,796   18.8 
Ensuiko   5,250   14.1   4,050   10.9    874 13.0 1,209   12.7 
Shinko      850     2.3      850     2.3      87   1.3    101     1.1 
Niitaka   3,050     8.2   3,050     8.2    530   7.9    670     7.0 
Teikoku   3,000     8.1   3,000     8.1    883 13.2 1,146   12.0 
Showa     ─     ─   1,570     4.2    ─   ─    214     2.2 
Tainan   1,570     4.2     ─     ─    113 1.7      ─     ─
Taito      350     0.9      350     0.9      47 0.7      30     0.3 
Shinchiku      500     1.3      500     1.3      24 0.4      40     0.4 
Sharoku      300     0.8      300     0.8      40 0.6      65     0.7 
Toyo   4,950   13.3     ─     ─    818 12.2      ─     ─
Koshun      350     0.9     ─     ─      12   0.2      ─     ─
Sum 37,250 100.0 37,250 100.0 6,710 100.0 9,529 100.0 
pulse duty factor 
of top four 22,330   59.9 27,630   74.2 4,156   61.9 7,263   76.2 
Source : Taiwan Sotokufu (1926) pp. 6-9 ; (1927) pp. 6-9 ; (1930) p. 84.
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III.　Cartel’s function of restraining competition and balancing 
the conflicting interests of members
　The bargaining process of “SSK” 7） for price stabilization was the most im-
portant in order to make certain whether the function of restraining compe-
tition came in or not. Balancing the conflicting interests of members was in-
dispensable to bring “SSK” into existence, because the modern sugar 
manufacturing industry possessed layered conflict structure as mentioned 
above.
7）　From now on, I will abbreviate “Santo Shobun Kyotei” to “SSK”.
Figure 4　Production Systems after the Third Reorganization (1943)
    Note : Because it was considered a merger until 1943 based on the data of the step in 
　　       March1941, and in April 1941, it was included for the factory that was dormant 
　　       since then. 
Source : Taiwan Sotokufu (1940) pp. 6-9.
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　I will review structural outline of the bargaining on “GBK” 8）, focusing on 
layered conflict structure of the modern sugar manufacturing industry as 
shown in Figure 5. On one hand, raw sugar companies were divided into 
four groups. More specifically, the Niitaka Company manufactured raw and 
white sugar, the Toyo Company manufactured raw and plantation white sug-
ar, the Teikoku, Shinko, and Taito Company manufactured only raw sugar, 
and other companies manufactured raw, white and plantation white sugar.
　Conflicting positions among raw sugar manufacturing companies were 
much different above all on retail price of raw sugar during its price uptrend 
period. As a matter of course, centrifugal sugar companies which didn’t pro-
duce white sugar simultaneously had strong will to sell their sugar for direct 
consumption rather than for raw sugar. Because the price of sugar for direct 
consumption was higher than one for raw sugar through raw sugar negotia-
tion. In addition, as plantation white sugar for direct consumption appeared 
8）　From now on, “Genryo Baibai Keiyaku” will be abbreviated to “GBK”.
Figure 5　Structural outline of  “Genryoto Baibai Kosho”
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in 1910s and increased its demand rapidly in 1930s, business environment 
has changed. That is, plantation white sugar negotiation had a decisive influ-
ence on “SSK”.
　On the other, whit e sugar companies which refined raw sugar were divid-
ed into four groups. To be more precise, the Dainihon Company manufac-
tured raw, white and plantation white sugar, the Niitaka Company manufac-
tured raw and white sugar, the Chuo and Tokyo refined company manufac-
tured only white sugar, and other companies except Dainihon manufactured 
raw, white and plantation white sugar. Above all things the Dainihon Compa-
ny excelled in a refining capacity as the pioneer company of the mainland 
white sugar industry and had a conflicting interest with other companies 
which also manufactured raw, white and plantation white sugar.
　I will take stock of such conflict structure among white sugar companies 
as shown in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 shows that the Dainihon and Tai-
wan Company purchased a lot of Javanese sugar for raw sugar and the 
Ensuiko,Minamimanshu Company, and city sugar merchants from which 
many other raw sugar companies purchased imported much sugar for direct 
consumption from Java. The Javanese sugar made layered conflict structure 
in the modern sugar manufacturing industry into much more complicated.
　As demonstrated by Table 4, which displays the pulse duty factor of re-
fined raw sugar in 1924, the factor of the Dainihon, Meiji, Ensuiko, and 
Table 3　Volume of Sugar imported from Java by Mitsui Bussan 
(from July, 1918 to June, 1919)　　　　　 　
raw sugar sugar for direct consumption total share (%)
Dainihon 868,860 868,860   38.2 
Taiwan 572,212 572,212   25.2 
Ensuiko 32,882   49,441 82,323     3.6 
Teikoku 88,913 88,913     3.9 
Minamimanshu 49,411 130,937 180,348     7.9 
city sugar merchants 139,933 339,075 479,008   21.1 
toatal 1,752,211 519,453 2,271,664 100.0 
Source : Mistui Bussan (1919) p. 42.
（picul）
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Taisho Company refined company was more than 60％ by raw sugar made 
in foreign countries, especially in Java. In the meantime, the Taiwan and Nii-
taka Company refined raw sugar made in Taiwan by major part. It follows 
that Javanese sugar was one of the most complicated factor for the modern 
sugar manufacturing industry.
　In 1920s, cartel’s function of restraining competition was limited as a re-
sult of repeated conflict and failure on striking hands on “SSK”, the function 
of balancing the conflicting interests of members added weight conversely. 
That is, the latter function came to exercise not in the phase of bargaining 
on “GBK” leading to “SSK” but in the phase of bargaining on “SSK” in spite 
of repeated conflict and failure. It was the result that importance of planta-
tion white sugar for direct consumption increased and only “GBK” could not 
stabilize sugar market price.
　In the phase of falling price all members of “Toren” shared mutual inter-
ests to enact “SSK”, by contrast in the phase of rising in price each interest 
conflicted to end in failure. Well then, why was the bargaining on “SSK” very 
successful with no exceptions during the second half in complete contrast as 
shown in Table 1 ? Two reasons were above all important. One reason was 
the self-sufficiency of sugar within empire Japan in 1929, and another was 
foundation of “SKK” 9） in December, 1928.
　All members of “Toren” shared mutual interests to avoid falling price be-
cause of excess supply since 1929 as shown in Table 5. Owing to foundation 
of “SKK”, stabilization of white sugar effected well to “GBK” and “SKK” was 
also realized in consequence. Reorganization of distribution by “SKK” in 
1928 succeeded in clearing away the pressure of Javanese sugar as opposed 
to the first half when the sugar was the part of the reason for much more 
complicated conflict structure in the modern sugar manufacturing industry.
　Under the layered conflict structure, to have been above-mentioned, es-
tablishment of “Toren”’s function of restraining competition was very limited 
except production adjustment in 1933 and 1934 as a result of excess produc-
tion in 1932 as shown in Table 5 and those two years’ agreements “Seisan 
9）　From now on, I will abbreviate “Sato Kyokyu Kumiai” to“SKK”.
Cartel’s Function of Balancing the Conflicting Interests of . . .（KUBO）　533
Chosei Kyotei” (relabeled “SSK”) was extremely anomalistic. For the mean-
while, function of balancing the conflicting interests of members was operat-
ed all the time to come in “GBK” as the prerequisite for “SSK”.
　In contrast to the function of restraining competition, the most consecu-
tive function of “Toren” was complementing resource one such as present-
ing petitions of consumption duty and custom duty to inland government, 
presenting petitions of sugar advancement policy to colonial government in 
Taiwan, “SYK” 10）, and gathering intelligence activity.
　“Toren” succeeded in presenting petitions on consumption duty and cus-
Table 5　Supply Demand Situation of Sugar in Japan (thousand piculs)
sugar 
production 
（①）
sugar 
production 
in Taiwan
（②）
share
（② /①，％）
consumption
（③） ①－③
1920 4,893 3,720 76.0   7,504 △ 2,611
1921 5,830 4,212 72.2 11,483 △ 5,653
1922 7,229 5,878 81.3 11,956 △ 4,727
1923 7,225 5,923 82.0 11,257 △ 4,032
1924 9,219 7,537 81.8 11,920 △ 2,701
1925 9,622 7,992 83.1 12,844 △ 3,222
1926 10,093 8,332 82.6 12,650 △ 2,557
1927   8,682 6,852 78.9 14,433 △ 5,751
1928 11,783 9,669 82.1 14,375 △ 2,592
1929 15,193 13,155 86.6 14,870 323
1930 15,517 13,508 87.1 14,296 1,221
1931 15,582 13,288 85.3 14,259 1,323
1932 19,258 16,484 85.6 15,401 3,857
1933 13,411 10,562 78.8 15,043 △ 1,632
1934 13,480 10,784 80.0 15,458 △ 1,978
1935 19,546 16,094 82.3 17,694 1,852
1936 18,331 15,028 82.0 18,567 △ 236
1937 20,049 16,789 83.7 18,482 1,567
1938 20,242 16,503 81.5 19,505 737
1939 27,856 23,646 84.9 20,986 6,870
Source :  Taiwan Sotokufu (1940) pp. 178-179, 182.
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tom duty to inland government three times, but the function of balancing the 
conflicting interests of members was necessary on the tariff reform of 1927 
before accomplishment of self-sufficient in 1929. For centering on the im-
port of Javanese sugar a three-tiered conflict structure, i.e. as evidenced by 
the facts noted above, casted a long shadow on presenting petitions of the 
tariff reform of 1927.
　On the other hand, “SYK” did not only strengthen “Toren”’s bargaining 
power against shipping companies through single-minded bargaining but 
bring sugar manufacturing companies profits such as refund money from 
sipping companies. That is, “SYK” as function of complementing resource 
played a great deal of roles to cooperate conflicting members of “Toren” on a 
daily basis as well as presenting petitions on consumption duty and custom 
duty. Such function of complementing resource was a key point to prolong 
their existence to the end without deactivating as is the case with function of 
balancing the conflicting interests of members.
IV.　Competition and cooperation of four established companies
　It was very difficult to cooperate within “Toren” as shown in the fact that 
the Dainihon Company set up itself in opposition to the Meiji Company and 
“Toren” itself faced a crisis of breakup in a phase of bargaining “SSK” in 
1927. However “Toren” seek out cooperation all the way along in concur-
rence with competition. Well then, why were competition and cooperation 
compatible in the modern sugar manufacturing industry ?
　First of all, I will review the competition side of the industry and put strat-
egies of four established companies in order as follows :
　1)　The Taiwan Company realized strategy to attach weight to manufac-
ture centrifugal sugar utilizing first mover advantage in colonial Taiwan 
and caught up with the Ensuiko Company in plantation white sugar 
expeditiou sly.
　2)　The Dainihon Company shifted in strategy from refined sugar in in-
land to centrifugal sugar involving plantation white sugar in Taiwan and 
10）　From now on, “Santo Yuso Kyotei” will be abbreviated to “SYK”.
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conquered the constraints of latecomer in raw sugar manufacturing and 
recovered from failure by means of a battery of M&A strategies.
　3)　The Meiji Company aimed for synergistic development between cen-
trifugal and white sugar manufacturing by diversification strategy and 
caught up with the Ensuiko and Taiwan Company in plantation white 
sugar.
　4)　The Ensuiko Company placed much value on plantation white sugar 
rather than white sugar from alpha to omega and managed well every 
production site all over Taiwan involving eastern area “Karenko” to re-
cover from big failure in 1927.
　I will examine the meaning of “Toren” for four established companies with 
my eye set on each strategy as mentioned above. It was the process of bar-
gaining on “GBK” in which conflict between Dainihon which had bargaining 
power as first mover of white sugar and other three companies as latecomer. 
For in spite that the Dainihon Company hoped for cheaper raw sugar price 
as a main buyer, other companies expected higher price as buyer rather 
than seller. In addition, the Taiwan, Meiji, and Ensuiko Company hoped for 
dealing with strongly as sugar for direct consumption rather than raw sugar 
the Dainihon Company bought as cheap as possible. Above all the Ensuiko 
Company asked for more distribution for plantation white sugar as a pioneer 
instead of raw sugar.
　Such a conflict structure resulted from the different strategies and posi-
tion in market of four established companies continued until the first half of 
1920s and it was bargaining of “SSK” in 1915 where the first breakoff ex-
posed. The reason why the “SSK” in 1922 was not approved was also result-
ed from conflict between the Dainihon Company attaching weight to white 
sugar manufacturing and the Ensuiko Company giving weight to plantation 
white sugar manufacturing. And the conflict assumed serious proportions in 
1930s when consumption of plantation white sugar increased at a great rate.
　I will review another serious conflict situation between the Dainihon Com-
pany and the Meiji Company after the “SSK” in 1927 was approved. Two 
changes surrounding two companies were part of the reason why they were 
opposed to each other. One change was the positioning of the Meiji Compa-
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ny as a counterbalance to the Dainihon Company in white sugar manufactur-
ing. In 1923 the white sugar manufacturing capacity for the Meiji Company 
did not fill 1/2 of the Dainihon Company which demonstrated the advantage 
of the first mover as shown in Table 6. However in 1930 the Meiji Company 
exceeded the Dainihon Company at last as shown in Table 7 and the Meiji 
Company became a counterbalance to the Dainihon Company in white sugar 
manufacturing.
　Table 7 also demonstrates two changes. One change is the centrifugal 
sugar manufacturing capacity and volume for the Meiji and Dainihon Com-
pany caught up with the Taiwan Company which demonstrated the advan-
tage of the first mover as shown in Table 6. Another change is the plantation 
white sugar manufacturing capacity and volume for the Taiwan and Meiji 
Company caught up with the Ensuiko Company which demonstrated the ad-
vantage of the first mover as shown in Table 6.
　The second change relevant to the conflict between the Dainihon and 
Meiji Company was such reorganization of sugar distribution led by raw sug-
ar companies as sugar merchants became impoverished in 1910s to 1920s. 
The stage had come when the Dainihon and Meiji Company having strong 
bearing on “GBK” determined the feasibility of “SSK” and their battle be-
came much more serious with tightening competition of marketing since the 
Table 6　Manufacturing Capacity and Production Volume of four established 
Companies (1923)　　　　　　　   　　　　　　　　　
centrifugal sugar
plantation 
white 
sugar
white sugar
capacity 
(ton) factories
volume 
(thousand 
piculs)
factories capacity (ton) factories
volume 
(thousand 
piculs)
Taiwan 9,080 11 133,203 1 100 1     2 
Dainihon 2,200   2   61,478 0 770 3 212 
Meiji 5,100   5   89,245 1 300 2     4 
Ensuiko 4,500   6   68,057 4 100 1     2 
Source : Taiwan Sotokufu (1923) pp. 16, 18, 51, 110-111.
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Meiji Company built the self-sales organization of “Meiji Shoten” as well as 
the marketing division of “Shomubu” built by the Dainihon Company.
　In the meantime why did four established companies carry on cooperat-
ing by way of “Toren” in spite of such conflicts and competition with each 
other ? Even in 1920s when “SSK” could not approve consistently, the reason 
why the “SSK” in 1927 was approved was that each centrifugal company ac-
knowledged coordinating every kind of manufactured sugar in a compre-
hensive manner was indispensable to stabilize the sugar price in dead sea-
son. The fact that “Toren” brought the function of balancing the conflicting 
interests of members to fruition in 1927 when the Dainohon and Meiji Com-
pany fell over with each other involving marketing and had their hands tied 
to drop out “Toren” showed that every member company found out “Toren” 
was only main body to stabilize the sugar price in the phase when plantation 
white sugar raised its head and each interest was much more complicated.
　Another reason why four established companies seek for cooperation by 
means of “Toren” was to counteract the influence of Javanese sugar which 
was a confusing factor in the modern sugar manufacturing industry. In those 
days when custom duties of raw sugar imported from Java to export refined 
sugar were paid back, white sugar companies were secured of as much as 
raw sugar possible from Java in an early date and sugar manufacturing com-
panies and sugar merchants bought a lot of Javanese sugar on speculation to 
Table 7　Manufacturing Capacity and Production Volume of four established 
Companies (1930)　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　    　
centrifugal sugar
plantation white 
sugar
white sugar
capacity 
(ton)
factories
volume 
(thousand 
piculs)
capacity 
(ton)
factories
capacity 
(ton)
factories
volume 
(thousand 
piculs)
Taiwan 11,330 13 376,670 44,325 3    430 3 149,256 
Dainihon
  6,900
  (9,950)
6 (9)
251,281
（327,529）
14,019 1 
   910
   (990)
4 (5) 255,003 
Meiji   7,950 7 262,323 28,083 3 1,050 4 250,617 
Ensuiko   5,250 6 177,834 66,901 3    400 2 104,145 
Source : Taiwan Sotokufu (1930) pp. 6, 8, 86, 133, 142.
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resell in Japan as shown in Table 3. In consequence Javanese sugar came to 
confuse the sugar price in Japanese market.
　At the same time Javanese sugar casted a long shadow on the Taiwanese 
sugar price as white sugar companies used Javanese sugar for inland as well 
as exporting until self-sufficiency could be achieved. Sugar manufacturing 
companies used low-cost Javanese sugar for raw sugar and sold their own 
raw sugar for direct consumption priced high. Consequentially inland had a 
market glut by sugar for direct consumption and the price fell into the same 
one of Javanese sugar as acting on the white sugar price.
　However four established companies shared mutual interests to avoid fall-
ing in price and seek for balancing the conflicting interests of members by 
achievement of “SSK” when raw sugar was oversupplied, in spite that they 
competed to import raw sugar from Java for profit-making. After all four es-
tablished companies expected profit speculated from Javanese sugar con-
fined to the phase of price stability.
V.　“Toren” and development of the modern 
sugar manufacturing industry
　I will examine the original regulating function of the Taiwan Company 
from which chairmen of “Toren” were elected for a long time on the occa-
sion of summing up the “Toren”’s function of balancing the conflicting inter-
ests. Because Naomichi Takechi, who was a chairman of “Toren” as well as a 
president of the Taiwan Company, played a mediation role between the Dain-
ihon and Meiji Company on the occasion of complicated conflicts in 1927 
and 1934.
　When both the Dainihon and Meiji Company didn’t comply with the 
agreement in 1927 as mentioned above, both companies made up their mind 
to withdraw from “Toren” and chairman Takechi gave voice to take the re-
sponsibility on himself and resign. The announce his intention to resign 
meant taking a decision of last resort as a consequence that chairman Take-
chi never made a plea for his own company’s interest and seek for industry-
wide interest all the time. In consequence chairman Takechi saved the seri-
ous situation of “Toren”.
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　Also in the case of the “SSK” in 1934 when the Meiji, Dainihon, Taito, and 
Nanyokohatsu Company were complicatedly conflicted, the conflict was re-
solved by the agency of chairman Takechi and the agreement was approved 
at the end of the fiscal year. Two cases as mentioned above demonstrates 
that regulating function of the Taiwan Company played an important role in 
order that “Toren” could balance the conflicting interests of members. So I 
understand the regulating function of the Taiwan Company was one of the 
important function of balancing the conflicting interests of members.
　Finally I will examine two contributions by “Toren” to development of the 
modern sugar manufacturing industry. One contribution was to restrain 
competition which depended on one of balancing the conflicting interests of 
members. In the modern sugar manufacturing industry possessed a layered 
conflict structure, as evidenced by the facts noted above, function of re-
straining competition was difficult to bring out except the limited phase 
when sugar market in Japan was excess supplied and sugar price was in dan-
ger of falling. It was noteworthy that “Toren” succeeded in the function as 
soon as not in a measured fashion.
　Another contribution was giving an impulse to inter-enterprise competi-
tion through its cartel’s function. Among others valuable contribution was 
that together with on-going function of complementing resource the very 
function of balancing the conflicting interests of members prolonged “To-
ren”’s existence on one side and created basis or business environment for 
profit-making competition on the other side.
　Consequentially I will review inter-enterprise competition of four estab-
lished companies as shown in Figure 6. As demonstrated by Figure 6, until 
1927 the Taiwan Company excelled in centrifugal sugar production share 
and three latecomers such as the Ensuiko, Meiji, and Dainihon Company fell 
over one another on the other hand. Figure 6 also demonstrates that the 
Dainihon and Meiji Company caught up with the Taiwan Company during 
the second reorganization period, and all together the Taiwan and Dainihon 
Company competed head to head at white heat.
　Such a heated competition by four established companies was nearly con-
nected with productivity expansion of each company. Table 8 demonstrates 
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that manufacturing capacity of four established companies increased in 
1911, 1912, 1921, 1926, 1927 and 1939 when three-tiered modern sugar man-
ufacturing industry reorganization occurred as mentioned above.
　As evidenced by two contributions as mentioned above, competition and 
cooperation coexisted in the modern sugar manufacturing industry and co-
operation on the keynote of competition was precisely reality of the industry. 
It was very important that the joint action of conflicting companies in “To-
ren” enabled coexistence with competition because cartel’s function of “To-
ren” was giving an impulse rather than a check to inter-enterprise competi-
tion. This case study can be also true of the assignment of Kikkawa (1991) 
that some cartels had economic rationalistic function in prewar Japan.
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Figure 6　Centrifugal Sugar Production Share of four established Companies
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Table 8　Manufacturing Capacity of four established Companies
Taiwan Dainihon Meiji Ensuiko
1910 3,490 1,200 810 1,550 
1911 6,430 1,200 810 2,750 
1912 7,580 2,200 1,910 3,450 
1913 7,580 2,200 2,910 3,450 
1914 7,880 2,200 2,910 3,450 
1915 7,800 2,200 3,660 3,950 
1916 7,800 2,200 3,660 3,950 
1917 8,380 2,200 3,600 3,950 
1918 8,380 2,200 3,600 3,950 
1919 8,380 2,200 3,600 3,950 
1920 8,380 2,200 3,600 3,950 
1921 9,080 2,200 5,100 4,500 
1922 9,080 2,200 5,100 4,500 
1923 9,080 2,200 5,100 4,500 
1924 8,780 2,200 5,100 4,500 
1925 8,780 3,200 5,100 4,500 
1926 8,780 3,200 5,100 5,250 
1927 11,330 6,400 6,850 5,250 
1928 11,330 6,400 6,850 5,250 
1929 11,330 6,400 7,950 5,250 
1930 11,330 6,900 7,950 5,250 
1931 11,330 6,900 7,950 5,250 
1932 11,330 6,900 7,950 5,250 
1933 11,330 6,900 7,950 5,250 
1934 11,330 8,100 7,950 5,250 
1935 11,330 9,950 7,950 6,450 
1936 11,330 9,950 7,950 6,450 
1937 11,330 9,950 8,950 6,450 
1938 11,330 9,950 8,950 6,450 
1939 16,650 18,300 15,500 9,900 
1940 16,650 18,900 15,500 9,900 
Source : Taiwan Sotokufu (1920) pp. 18-19, (1921-40) ‘Shinshiki Seitojo Ichiranhyo’.
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　　[P ostscript] This paper was originally prepared for the presentation at the 16th 
Annual Conference of the European Business History Association 2012 in Par-
is, August 30-Semtember 1, 2012 and I touched up to be a full-paper this time.
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